While states often establish courts and other adjudicators with authority to make decisions against their will, they retain the concrete power not to comply with decisions, the right to withdraw from institutions, and the prerogative to modify their design in case they do not perform as expected. Dissatisfied states may seek and have sought to weaken judicial oversight, exit adjudication systems, and dismantle adjudicators entirely.
Considering concrete cases of state resistance to judicial decisions, the project examines the operation of international adjudication, including the design of adjudication mechanisms and systems, the means by which adjudication influences state conduct, and the reaction of states to adverse decisions. By assessing instances of compliance, non-compliance and resistance to adjudication in the various fields of international law, the project explores the prospects for the evolution of the relationship between states and adjudicators over the next decades.
Duration: Since 2017
Researcher: Geraldo Vidigal