Research security is a relatively new yet fascinating research topic connected to the EU’s openness to the world in research and innovation. In the Netherlands, it is better known as ‘knowledge security’ (kennisveiligheid in Dutch). Everyone agrees that international collaboration is crucial for the development of cutting-edge technologies. Consider, for instance, the development of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, biotechnologies, and energy technologies. Yet this openness for innovation has increasingly been challenged and scrutinised—legally and politically. As geopolitical tensions intensify, international research collaboration is seen as risking the transfer of critical knowledge and technology that may undermine the security of the EU and its Member States. This is part of the broader, and often problematic, phenomena of the ‘securitisation’ of universities and other research performing organisations.
My research project focuses on the analysis of normative tensions arising from international research collaboration and the adoption of research security measures. The EU, its Member States, and research institutions’ readiness to control international research collaboration has given rise to fundamental tensions among the values of innovation, security, and fundamental rights including academic freedom, right to science, and the principle of non-discrimination. I have been examining what tensions there have been, how knowledge institutions have approached those tensions, and how such tensions should be resolved.
My academic interest on research security (and knowledge security) builds on my expertise in ‘dual-use’ export controls. Dual-use has been one of my research topics since 2015. Dual-use export control is a very technical filed of law, but I have been intrigued by politics behind its technical veil. ‘Dual-use’ items are generally understood as those which can be used for both civil and military (thus ‘dual’) purposes. Think about satellite technologies, for example. The automated analysis of satellite imagery is crucial for tracking environmental and climate change. Yet the same group of technologies has military applications, for instance to identify and track military vehicles and other military targets.
Dual-use export control is relevant not only for companies but also for universities and other research organisations. For instance, sharing technical data among members of an international research project can be subject to controls. Now, if we just stick to export controls, the issues are relatively clear to the EU-based research organisations. The heart of the problem, however, is that ‘research security’ that the EU wishes to facilitate is much broader. It is part of broader Economic Security and open strategic autonomy. My research interest is to analyse, from legal perspectives, the interactions between dual-use, research security, economic security, and fundamental rights to critically examine the EU’s connection with and positionality in the world in facilitating technological innovation.